This paper applies the new heterogeneous firm CGE model of Caliendo and Parro (2009) to determine what the Ricardian gains are from changing partners for members of a trade bloc. We focus on the MERCOSUR case, using a model with 48 sectors and 5 countries. Motivated by recent policy discussions, we quantify Uruguay's trade and welfare effects from signing a Free Trade Agreement with the United States and leaving MERCOSUR. We find positive welfare effects for Uruguay from bilaterally reducing tariffs with the United States. Most of the gains come from having access to lower-cost intermediate inputs for production. We then consider the policy experiment of bilaterally eliminating tariffs between all members of MERCOSUR and the United States. We find that Uruguay has the largest gains, while Argentina and Brazil do not benefit much. This paper also illustrates how new models are a promising tool for the analysis of trade. 1 We are grateful for the comments of
Introduction
This paper uses the Caliendo and Parro (2009) heterogeneous firm, multi-country -multisector quantitative general equilibrium model for trade policy analysis in order to determine what the Ricardian welfare gains are from changing partners for members of a trade bloc. Consider a group of countries that form a custom union. These countries enjoy free trade in goods among members and will apply a common external tariff to nonmember countries. Suppose now that a large developed country that does not belong to the trade bloc offers to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with one of the member countries. Should the country not sign the agreement? Should the country sign the agreement and therefore leave the bloc? Should the bloc sign the agreement? These are some of the questions that will be addressed here.
We focus on the case of the Mercado Comun del Sur (henceforth MERCOSUR).
MERCOSUR is a custom union formed by four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. In the year 2006, Uruguay faced the decision of whether or not to sign an FTA with the United States. This presented an evident trade-off for Uruguay. On the one side, the United States would lower the tariffs it applied to Uruguay. On the other side, Uruguay would have to leave MERCOSUR, and therefore Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay would increase the tariffs they applied to Uruguay to the external common tariff level. However, since Uruguay would not belong to MERCOSUR anymore, it would have the option of modifying the tariff policy it applied to the Rest of the World.
In this paper we show how to apply the quantitative model developed in Caliendo and Parro (2009) to quantify and decompose the welfare effects for Uruguay of leaving MERCOSUR and signing an FTA with the United States. We also use the model to quantify the trade and welfare effects of other counterfactual scenarios such as MERCOSUR, as a bloc, signing an FTA with the United States.
More generally, the empirical application presented in this paper sheds light on the welfare effects of custom unions. Viner (1950) was the first to address theoretically the issue of welfare gains of Custom Unions, introducing the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya (1999) present a synthesis of theoretical research on this topic since Viner's work. Empirical literature on the welfare effects of Custom Unions and Regional Trade agreements is much more scarce. Magee (2008) studies the intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects of different Custom Unions, Regional Trade Agreements and Free Trade Agreements using a dynamic gravity equation controlling for country pair, importer-year, and exporter-year fixed effects. He finds that Customs Unions generate the largest long-run increase in intra-bloc trade on average. Preferential trading arrangements, on the other hand, lead to much smaller increases in trade flows. Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) study the intra-bloc trade effect of twelve Regional Trade Agreements, concluding that they have increased intra-bloc trade. Yeats (1997) This paper provides an example of an ex-ante evaluation of trade policy questions.
The most popular tools for trade policy evaluation are the computable general equilibrium (CGE/AGE) models. These are multi-sector general equilibrium models and can be employed to evaluate ex-ante changes in trade policy. Examples of these models are the Michigan Brown-Deardorff-Stern model and the Purdue GTAP model (see Hertel 1997) 2 . We contribute to this area of research by providing a new model for tariff policy evaluation which uses the new trade literature on heterogeneous firms.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the Caliendo and Parro (2009) model, and section 3 briefly describes the history and characteristics of MERCOSUR.
The data used to perform the empirical exercises are described in section 4, and section 5 explains the empirical exercises we perform and shows the results. Finally, section 6 presents the main conclusions. Caliendo and Parro (2009) and a low data requirement to evaluate the general equilibrium effects of tariff policy (only one elasticity has to be estimated) and it is an open-source and flexible tool to evaluate any type of tariff concessions. In this section we briefly describe the production structure of the model. For a more detailed description of the structure of the model and the way to solve for the equilibrium we refer the reader to Caliendo and Parro (2009 given sector can be used to produce intermediate goods not only in its own sector but also in every other sector. For instance, machinery is used not only to produce machinery, but also to produce cars, textiles, etc. Also, each composite good is used to produce not only intermediate goods but also final goods. Similar to the models of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , intermediate goods within each sector are produced with a stochastic efficiency level coming from a Frechet distribution. Making the model more general than those in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , this probabilistic distribution is assumed to be sector-specific. Households derive utility from consuming final goods and income is given by labor income, lump-sum transfers from the Government due to tariff revenues and income coming from the country-level trade deficit.
A quantitative model for trade policy analysis
There are two types of sectors: tradable and non-tradable. Within each tradable sector, intermediate goods are also tradable. Each tradable good is subject to two types of trade costs: an iceberg-type cost as in Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) , and an ad valorem flat-rate tariff applied over unit prices. The model allows for endogenous sectoral trade deficit, but deficits at the country level are exogenous. in price this will affect the cost of production of goods in all countries that import them.
Note that in this model changes in trade policy have effects on the intensive as well as the extensive margin. Changes in trade policy can increase or reduce the amount of goods imported from abroad (intensive margin) but they can also change the lowest-cost supplier of particular goods (change in the extensive margin). All of these channels are contemplated in this model.
Using the case of MERCOSUR, which is described in the next section, we will present several policy experiments as an example of the applicability of the model. extended to the year 1980, but, given the national policies that each member implemented during the '70s, which gave more preference to national development projects, and the political and military instability of the countries as well as the economic and political rivalry that arose between Argentina and Brazil, the ALALC lacked support to achieve its original goals. That is why, after two decades of existence, the ALALC was abolished and a second Treaty of Montevideo was signed. In this treaty the "Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración" (ALADI, Latin-American Integration Association) was created, which had the same goals as ALALC, but without imposing any concrete compromise between the members to create a Free Trade Area.
In the middle of the 1980s Argentina was returning to a democratic political system, and surprisingly, in 1985, after years of political and economic confrontation, the new presidents of Argentina and Brazil signed the "Declaración de Iguazú" (Declaration of Iguazú), in which they manifested their will to accelerate the process of bilateral integration. This was formally established in 1986 when the "Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica Argentina-Brazil" (PICE, Argentina-Brazil Economic and Integration Cooperation Program) was signed. It consisted of 24 protocols involving topics from capital goods to economic and social planning. This was a real success for both economies, as manifested by the increasing flow of trade between them, which fomented in 1988 a new treaty of integration, cooperation and development that fixed a time frame of ten years to eliminate all barriers of trade between the two countries.
Finally, in 1990 both countries signed the Buenos Aires Act, in which they compromised to reach a bilateral integration by December 31, 1994. Paraguay and Uruguay, both countries geographically situated between Argentina and Brazil, felt the need to be incorporated in this integration (following a domino effect, we believe). The initial step their government took was to hold a meeting with the presidents of Argentina and Brazil in order to express their will to create a multilateral agreement among the four countries.
The 26 of March of 1991, with the treaty of Asuncion, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay formalized the creation of a common market between the countries, as it is wrote in the article 1 of the treaty, involving the free flow of capital goods, services and productive factors by eliminating all tariffs between members and imposing a unique external tariff. They also compromised to coordinate their macroeconomic policies involving: international trade, agriculture, industry, currency, transportation and communications in order to ensure adequate conditions for competitiveness between the members. So far, more than ten years later, MERCOSUR has only achieved the creation of a custom union with some exceptions. This is a real example of the difficulty involved in the creation of a custom union. We will try to describe briefly the process that was necessary to unify the common external tariffs and to eliminate the interregional tariffs.
Interregional tariffs
In the treaty of Asuncion, articles 5 and 6 established the procedure by which the interregional tariffs of the members must be reduced. It was a progressive, linear and automatic method starting in 1991 in order to reach the zero tariffs level by January 1, 1995. The first reduction was in the amount of 47% and in each consecutive semester there was a further reduction of seven percent. In order to adjust to the process of integration and minimize the possible negative effects of changing the production structure of the economy, each country was allowed to present a list of exceptions to the tariff reduction. Argentina presented a list with 394 items, Brazil had 324, Paraguay 439 and Uruguay 960. These lists had to be reduced each year by twenty percent for Argentina and Brazil, and by ten percent for the first two years and then twenty percent in each subsequent year for Paraguay and Uruguay. In the year 1995, the interregional tariffs were to drop to zero for most of the items, leaving each country with a small list of exceptions. Some of the items that are on the list of exceptions are autos and auto parts, sugar, telecommunication equipment and electronics; these exceptions have created some debate between Argentina and Brazil. This has occurred because most of these sectors or items have had very different tariff treatment by the two countries in the past. For example, Argentina has in the last decades been reducing the tariffs applied to the electronics sector in order to catch up with new technologies; Brazil, on the other hand, has protected its national sector. In this case, Argentina could expect that as a result of the custom union trade could divert from the rest of the world's superior and lower-cost technology to Brazil's inferior and higher-cost technology. This problem is also directly related to the external tariffs of the union, as we will see in the next section.
Common External Tariff
Changes in the welfare effects over the members of a custom union are very sensitive to the vector of common external tariffs that is implemented. Kemp and Wan (1976) showed that if the members of the custom union optimally established the level of the tariff vector, then the resulting outcome is that no member is worse off than before, even when one is better off than before. However, in practice it is very difficult to implement that optimal vector.
The common external tariff in MERCOSUR has been applied since 1995 to more than 80% of imported items, ranging in value from 0 to 20 percent and with 11 different levels. As in the case of the interregional tariff, each country has its own list of exceptions to the common external tariff. In the Protocol of Ouro Preto (1995), it was established that the products in the list should reach their "normal tariff level" in the year Some of the items that were included in the exceptions list have been a source of debate because of the different tariff structure that each country had with extra-zone countries.
Electronics and telecommunication equipment had an average tariff rate of 35% in Brazil, while in the rest of the member countries they had a very low or no tariff. After long negotiations a consensus has been reached to apply an external tariff of around 16% to these products. By the year 2006, all members had to adjust and converge to this level.
These and some further issues, like the redistribution of tariff revenues and tariffs on capital goods, are among the problems that the members of MERCOSUR must solve in order to continue with the process of complete integration.
Has MERCOSUR increased trade among members?
In this section we document the evolution of trade flows for MERCOSUR members. As we can see from these figures, in general there has not been a substantial increase in the magnitude of trade within the MERCOSUR bloc. First, we do not observe a jump in trade flows among the members when MERCOSUR was created in 1994. Second, we 3 We excluded Paraguay from this analysis and from the policy experiments described below because of data constraints.
find that in general exports to other MERCOSUR countries make up less than 25% of total exports for each member (less than 15% for Brazil) and imports from other members make up less than 40% of the total (less than 10% for Brazil). Moreover, with the exception of Argentina's imports from MERCOSUR, trade flows among members are lower than when the bloc was created. 
Quantitative exercise: Counterfactual scenarios and results
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These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. States sign an FTA. Counterfactual scenario 3 is the case in which Uruguay unilaterally reduces the tariffs it applies to the rest of the world; and finally, counterfactual scenario 4 tries to capture the effects of Uruguay signing FTAs with countries in the rest of the world. We caution the reader on the way the results of the policy experiments should be interpreted. The model will consider how variables are affected by only a change in the tariff vector. Other policy variables like changes in non-tariff barriers, quotas and capital restrictions will not be analyzed here. We do believe that these other variables are important and that they play an important role in the process of liberalization. However, we want to focus on one channel, the effect of only tariffs on the allocation of resources in a heterogeneous firm model. Consider the case in which Uruguay leaves MERCOSUR. As a consequence, Argentina and Brazil impose the external common tariff on all goods imported from Uruguay. In this first scenario, we assume that there is no other change in the system. Table 1 summarizes the current scenario and Table 2 this first counterfactual scenario. Note: This table describes the tariff structure for counterfactual scenario 1. tariff j i,n represents tariffs applied by country i to country n in sector j, ECT j is the external common tariff applied by MERCOSUR members in sector j, and ARG, BRA, UY, US and ROW are Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the United States and the Rest of the World, respectively.
The first two columns of Table 3 We now consider another trade policy experiment. Suppose that Uruguay is considering signing an FTA with several other countries. The logic behind this exercise is that once
Uruguay decides not to be a member of the MERCOSUR trading bloc anymore, it can apply any tariff concession it wants to the rest of the world. We consider first the case in which Uruguay applies zero tariffs to the rest of the world-that is, the case where Uruguay follows a unilateral liberalization process, counterfactual scenario 3. Table 3 (Scenario 3) presents the results. Uruguay's real wages increase by 5.9% and its welfare increases by a lower amount, 4.9%. In this case there is a larger decrease in tariff revenues, which explains the difference between the two measures. Notice that in this case welfare in Argentina is not affected. This is because the gains from having access to cheaper intermediate goods are countered by the loss from the fact that now Argentina cannot be the most efficient producer for Uruguay in some sectors. Now we analyze counterfactual scenario 4, in which Uruguay leaves MERCOSUR, signs an FTA with the United States and also starts signing other FTAs with important economies in addition to following a unilateral liberalization process. This has been the integration strategy of other developing countries such as Chile. The difference from scenario 3 is that the rest of the world also decreases tariffs applied to Uruguay to the zero level. Scenario 4 in Table 3 shows the results of this policy experiment. Uruguay's welfare increases by 6.6% and its real wages by 7.7%. Therefore, this integration strategy enhances welfare the most for Uruguay.
To further understand these results, we now evaluate the role of trade in intermediate inputs. In table 4 In Caliendo and Parro (2009) we show that sectoral linkages also help to spread the gains from tariff reductions. The reason is that tariff reductions not only affect the sector to which the tariff is targeted, but also affect indirectly all the sectors in the economy which are related to that particular sector. Therefore, there can be a propagation as well as an amplification effect of changes in tariffs. We now focus on the trade effects of these integration strategies. 
